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Abstract: Market conditions are known to matter for firm performance and growth. This study 
explores how changing levels of uncertainty and competition affect interfirm ties of entrepreneurial 
firms as markets transition from nascent to growth stage. Tracing 6 entrepreneurial game publishers 
during the growth stage of the US wireless gaming market, the findings reveal that in a growth stage 
market, as uncertainty decreases, certain ties of entrepreneurial firms are terminated. First, existing 
partners may cut ties and become competitors after entering the market directly. This is a “winner’s 
curse” as more successful firms are more likely to entice their partners to enter the market directly. 
Second, ties may be terminated as prominent firms that are “overwhelmed” with too many partners 
cut ties with low to mediocre performance while their remaining partners enter a positive spiral of 
tie strength and performance. Finally, as uncertainty decreases, new firms may enter the market as 
competitors to prominent firms. While entrepreneurial firms with high and low performing ties to 
prominent partners may find ties with these new entrants attractive, those with mediocre ties to few 
prominent partners find this move too risky and wait for a first mover to legitimate it. Overall, the 
findings show that changing levels of uncertainty and competition in growth stage markets can have 
different consequences for firms due to heterogeneity in their ties and power relative to partners. 
The findings provide several contributions to literature regarding the relationship between interfirm 
ties, firm performance, and market evolution.  
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Market conditions are known to matter for firm performance and growth (Anderson and 
Tushman, 1990; Gort and Klepper, 1982; Hite and Hesterly; 2001; Koka and Prescott, 2008). While 
extant work has widely explored firms’ chances of survival as markets evolve, e.g. during industry 
shakeouts (Argyres and Bigelow, 2007; Klepper and Grady, 1990), the question of how changing 
market conditions affect interfirm ties has received much less attention (Balland, De Vaan and 
Boschma, 2013). On the one hand, scholars suggest that changing environmental conditions and 
external shocks are likely to affect the formation and evolution of interfirm ties (Koka and Prescott, 
2008), and that there might even be a coevolutionary relationship between these factors (Jacobides 
and Winter, 2005). On the other hand, extant literature, discussed in the following section, focuses 
mostly on how ties can help firms mitigate uncertainty and competition, but not how the formation 
and evolution of network ties are in turn affected by these conditions.  
This study is based on the premise that understanding the effects of changing market 
conditions on firms’ ties requires consideration of firm, partner, and tie heterogeneity as prior work 
has shown that firms’ different positions, resources and power relative to partners affect their ability 
to form and manage ties (Powell et al, 2005; Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009; Santos and Eisenhardt, 
2009). Thus, with a longitudinal and qualitative approach, this study explores the complex dynamics 
of how changing levels of uncertainty and competition during market growth affect the formation 
and evolution of interfirm ties during the transition of the US wireless gaming market from nascent 
to growth stage. The findings uncover what might await entrepreneurial firms that depend on 
interfirm ties for survival in a rapidly growing market; e.g. which of their ties will strengthen or 
break due to the changing levels of competition and uncertainty. They reveal that in a growth stage 
market, as uncertainty decreases, certain ties of entrepreneurial firms are terminated. First, existing 
partners may cut ties and become competitors after entering the market directly. This is a “winner’s 
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curse” as more successful firms are more likely to entice their partners to enter the market directly. 
Second, ties may be terminated as prominent firms that are “overwhelmed” with too many partners 
cut ties with low to mediocre performance while their remaining partners enter a positive spiral of 
tie strength and performance. Finally, as uncertainty decreases, new firms may enter the market as 
competitors to prominent firms. While entrepreneurial firms with high and low performing ties to 
prominent partners may find ties with these new entrants attractive, those with mediocre ties to few 
prominent partners find this move too risky and wait for a first mover to legitimate it. Overall, the 
findings show that changing levels of uncertainty and competition in growth stage markets can have 
different consequences for firms due to heterogeneity in their ties and power relative to partners.  
The findings provide several contributions to literature. Leveraging the rich data of a 
longitudinal, qualitative study, this paper provides a comprehensive picture of how market 
conditions affect entrepreneurial firms directly through their interfirm ties and indirectly through the 
actions of other firms in the network. The findings reveal, for instance, that during market growth 
stage, prominent firms that operate in multiple markets may experience a lag in allocating resources 
to the new market, which, along with reduced market uncertainty, leads them to cut off most of their 
partners. This suggests that entrepreneurial firms and large corporations may experience market 
growth differently and that these experiences are intertwined through the ties that they form, 
manage, and cut. The interaction of such firm, interfirm, and market level dynamics improve our 
existing knowledge on the coevolution of firm strategy, interfirm ties and market networks1 (e.g. 
Hoffmann, 2007; Koka et al, 2006; Koza and Lewin, 1998).  
                                                 
1 A market network is the entire collection of firms operating in a structured context for exchange (Fligstein, 2001) in 
order to deliver a product/service to customers. This definition emphasizes collaboration among firms, which is common 
in nascent markets that lack an agreed-upon architecture (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996) and “networked” or 
“platform” markets where high interdependence among multiple firm types contribute to an entire product system 
(Eisenmann, 1997; Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009) or knowledge-intensive fields (e.g. biotech, Powell et al, 1996).  
 
 3 
By tracing the different growth trajectories of entrepreneurial firms with similar starting 
positions,  this study also contributes to extant literature in entrepreneurship (e.g. Eisenhardt an 
Schoongoven, 1990; Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009) by showing that entrepreneurial growth not only 
depends on how the executives ‘prepare their firm’ before the competition intensifies, but also on 
the strategies and limitations of their partners. It shows for instance that large and resourceful 
partners may not be as beneficial as previously thought (Baum et al, 2000; Stuart, 2000; Powell et al, 
1996) as it takes them time to divert their attention and resources from other markets.  
Finally, this study builds on extant work on the external (Balland, 2012; Broekel and Boschma, 
2012) and internal forces (Gluckler, 2007; McKelvey, 2002; Volberda and Lewin, 2003) that drive 
network structures by providing a glimpse at network dynamics during market growth. While 
confirming that decreasing uncertainty leads to more firms entering the market (Aldrich and Fiol, 
1994; Baron et al, 1999), the findings also highlight endogenous counterforces driving the market 
towards a small world (Watts and Strogatz, 1998). One implication of this for work on industry 
shakeouts (Gort and Klepper, 1982; Klepper and Grady, 1990) is that in interdependent (i.e. 
networked) environments, a partner shakeout may precede the industry shakeout. More generally, 
this field study reveals that market conditions driving change are more complex than just a joint 
increase in competition and reduction in uncertainty. Firm and interfirm level factors also fuel 
network dynamics and create heterogeneity in how environmental conditions affect firm survival. 
Overall, the theoretical model emerging from the findings is a step towards understanding the 
relationship between firm strategy, interfirm ties, and market evolution.  
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
There is vast empirical evidence that interfirm ties can significantly improve a firm’s 
performance and chance of survival (Baum et al, 2000; Doz et al, 2000; Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; 
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Gulati and Higgins, 2003; Hoffman, 2007; Lavie, 2007; Madhavan et al, 1998; Powell et al, 1996; 
Stuart et al, 1999), and that these positive effects are particularly significant in the presence of high 
degrees of transaction volume and collaboration between partners (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Madhok 
and Tallman, 1998), as well as partners’ experience with ties and tie management capability overall 
(Anand and Khanna, 2000; Heimeriks et al, 2015; Kale et al, 2002; Lavie and Singh, 2012). 
Interfirm ties are particularly important in dynamic environments where firms, particularly 
entrepreneurial ones with limited resources, are dependent on an ever-changing set of resources for 
survival (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009). One environment 
where ties are arguably critical for firm survival is the transition of a market from nascent to growth 
stage where environmental conditions change rapidly (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Anderson and 
Zeithaml, 1984). Work in various streams of literature (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Baron et al, 1999; 
Klepper, 1996) shows that at the emergence of new markets, uncertainty, which is defined as the 
unpredictability of the environment (Beckman et al, 2004; Folta, 1998; Martin et al, 2014), is high 
due to customers’ limited experience and preferences (Benner and Tripsas, 2012; Walker and 
Weber, 1984), particularly when the product / service is perceived as novel (Fleming, 2001), as well 
as due to supply related issues such as performance limitations and long-term value of the new 
product / service, particularly if it concerns a new technology (Anderson and Tushman, 1990; 
Sorenson, 2000; Tushman and Anderson, 1986). Over time, as products are tested, uncertainty 
decreases (Porter, 1980; Utterback and Suarez, 1993; Klepper, 1996), making the market attractive 
for new entrants and increasing competition (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Baron et al, 1999). Industry 
life cycle studies have shown quantitatively that as markets grow, they go through a period of 
“shakeout” in the number of producers (Gort and Klepper, 1982; Klepper and Grady, 1990) where 
those firms that are unable to efficiently produce the “dominant design” that emerges are selected 
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out of the market in the face of intense competition. Later studies have also looked at firm 
heterogeneity and survival rates and showed how, for instance, firms’ transaction misalignment led 
to lower rate of survival during industry shakeouts (Argyres and Bigelow, 2007).  
While these studies provide great insights into firms’ chances of survival as markets evolve, 
they have paid much less attention to the changing nature of collaboration during these times 
(Malerba, 2006; Ter Wal and Boschma, 2011). Scholars suggest that as markets evolve, the nodes in 
a network change due to the entry and exit of firms (Boschma and Frenken, 2010) and that 
industries that are subject to continuous flows of new firms entering due to disruptive technological 
change (Rosenkopf and Tushman, 1994; Rosenkopf and Padula, 2008) should have interfirm 
network structures that are less stable. For example, incumbent firms can increase the number of 
firms that adopt a specific technology by entering into a partnership with new entrants (Rosenkopf 
and Padula, 2008), which can in turn increase these new firms’ success rates. Balland et al (2013) 
argue that “while the entry and exit of firms and the changing nature of competition are inextricably 
interwoven with changing network structures, this domain of research has remained largely 
unexplored” (Balland et al, 2013: 745). In fact, a review of studies looking at the relationship 
between interfirm ties and market conditions reveals that these studies mostly focus on how ties can 
help firms mitigate uncertainty and competition, but not how network ties are affected by 
environmental conditions and how firm, partner, and tie heterogeneity play a role.  
Studies that look at interfirm ties during market uncertainty find that when uncertainty is high, 
firms rely more on past ties and partner status in forming new ties (Galaskiewicz and Shatin, 1981; 
Podolny, 1994). They are also more likely to opt for contractual ties with lower costs of formation, 
management, and dissolution (Gulati, 1995; Santoro and McGill, 2005) and commit fewer relation-
specific resources (Rowley et al, 2000).  At the ego-centric alliance network (portfolio) level, 
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scholars find that firms manage uncertainty by forming more ties (Beckman and Haunschild, 2002; 
McGrath, 1997), adding more diversity (i.e. non-redundant ties) to their network (De Vaan, 2014; 
Rowley et al, 2000) and building multiple parallel “probing alliances” (Hoffmann, 2007; Ozcan and 
Eisenhardt, 2009). Industry life cycle studies similarly find that the stage of the industry affects the 
type of ties firms form such that at the early stages of an industry when uncertainty is high, firms 
form ties to “explore” and facilitate technological innovations, while later, the goal is to “exploit”, 
e.g. with geographically closer and cognitively similar partners (Balland et al, 2013; Elg, 2000; 
Hagedoorn, 1993). In a rare attempt to link interfirm ties, firm survival and environmental 
conditions, De Vaan (2014) shows that in uncertain environments, the failure of arms’ length 
partners lowers focal firm’s chance of survival while in stable environments, losing strong (i.e. 
durable, intensive) ties affects firm survival more. While providing a clear picture of tie formation 
and management as means to mitigate market conditions, these studies focus much less on how 
firms’ ability to form and manage ties might be affected by changing levels of uncertainty. 
Discovering these effects requires a look at firms’ entire ego-centric network, e.g. how its partners 
increase / decrease their number and strength of ties as uncertainty levels change in the market. 
A second key characteristic of markets is the level of competition. Studies that look at 
interfirm ties and market competition find that firms typically respond to increasing competition 
either by forming alliances with competitors’ partners or by forming “countervailing alliances” with 
similar partners (Gimeno, 1994). Others suggest that in a market with limited resources and partners, 
firms often get into a “race” to enhance their position ahead of their competitors, or to block rivals 
from forming ties with key partners (Gomes-Casseres, 1996; Gulati, 1995; Nohria and Garcia-Pont, 
1991; Park et al., 2002). In certain industries like airlines, firms may mitigate competition by 
joining a constellation of ties (Lorenzoni and Ornati, 1989; Nohria and Garcia-Pont, 1991). 
 7 
However, as with uncertainty, extant work has fallen short of explaining the effects of competition 
on interconnected firms, which requires consideration of heterogeneity among firms’ partners in 
terms of different types, resources and tie strength. Specifically, critical questions such as how, 
during market growth, the direct ties of focal firms are affected by market entry of firms of the same 
type, of a different type, and of a new type remain unanswered regarding the effects of competition.   
As outlined above, prior research on interfirm ties and market conditions has mostly explored 
how ties can help firms mitigate varying levels of uncertainty and competition as markets change 
and not how these conditions in turn affect interfirm ties. Secondly, the majority of extant studies 
have a cross-sectional approach to examine the effects of uncertainty or competition separately 
rather than simultaneously, as it would happen in reality. A noteworthy exception is Koka et al 
(2006), who consider both factors at the network level and predict that as uncertainty decreases and 
competition increases, e.g. during market growth, networks will “shrink” with more ties terminated 
and fewer new ties formed, whereas if uncertainty increases and competition decreases, the network 
will “expand”. This work provides a stepping-stone for studying the combined effects of market 
uncertainty and competition on interfirm ties. However, as a conceptual piece where all nodes and 
ties in the network are identical, it does not go beyond first order effects to look at how, in a 
heterogeneous network, the formation, strengthening/weakening and dissolution of ties coevolve.  
As indicated above, examining the consequences of varying levels of uncertainty and 
competition for interfirm ties requires consideration of the different types of firms at different 
positions and with different levels of resources and power in a market network. Prior work has 
shown that these factors have consequences for firms’ ability to form and manage ties. In a seminal 
paper, Powell et al (2005) showed how firms with strong ties to prominent partners in a network can 
use the resources flowing from these partners to invest into more business with existing partners and 
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new business with new ones. Other studies have shown how entrepreneurial firms resort to unique 
strategies to form and manage ties with prominent partners in nascent markets, e.g. promoting 
interdependence in a mutually beneficial market architecture, forming simultaneous ties with 
interdependent prominent firms that are not yet connected, sequential resource allocation (Ozcan 
and Eisenhardt, 2009), and uniting against a prominent firm claiming the nascent market (Santos 
and Eisenhardt, 2009). While we know that changes in a network result from tie formation and 
management decisions of organizations with heterogeneous characteristics such as age or size 
(Balland et al, 2013), there still is a gap in how changes in market conditions affect interfirm ties of 
these firms differently, and how, in turn, these decisions trickle down the network.   
The present study addresses these gaps through a longitudinal and qualitative examination of 
interfirm ties of entrepreneurial firms and their prominent partners in a setting where market 
conditions rapidly change, i.e. when markets transition from nascent to growth stage. By exploring 
the research question, how changing levels of uncertainty and competition during market growth 
affect the formation and evolution of interfirm ties, it aims to answer previous calls to explore the 
coevolutionary relationship between interfirm ties and market conditions (Koka et al, 2006) as well 
as among interfirm ties within a network (Zaheer and Soda, 2009; Ahuja et al, 2012). From an 
entrepreneurship perspective, uncovering this process can help us understand what might await an 
entrepreneurial firm in a rapidly changing market, e.g. which ties they can expect to strengthen or 
lose. More broadly, it can provide insights to the limitations of firm strategy (Koza and Lewin, 1998; 
Park et al, 2002) and contribute to knowledge on the role of structure versus agency in interfirm 
networks (Gulati and Gargiulo 1999; Powell et al. 1996, Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009). Finally, at a 
macro level, it can contribute to extant research on how networks evolve (Briscoe and Tsai, 2011; 
Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Human and Provan, 2000; Zaheer et al, 2000), how interfirm dynamics 
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constitute markets (Jacobides, 2005; Ozcan and Santos, 2015; Powell et al, 2005) and uncover 
microprocesses that lead to variances in performance among firms in a certain market stage (Gort 
and Klepper, 1982; Klepper and Grady, 1990; Porter, 1980; Utterback and Suarez, 1993). 
METHODS 
Given the limited theory and lack of empirical accounts on the research question described 
above, this study is based on an inductive theory building approach (Eisenhardt, 1989), which is 
particularly useful to uncover a process (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). The research design is 
based on multiple-cases, which enable a replication logic (Yin, 1984), where each of the six cases, 
described below, confirm inferences drawn from the others. In addition, the study is embedded with 
multiple units of analysis (firm, interfirm tie, and alliance network), which is critical for uncovering 
the various factors that may drive tie evolution during market growth in different subunits.  
The setting is the U.S. wireless gaming industry, a market that emerged in late 1999 with 
scattered activity by several firms to create games for wireless phones. This market is attractive for 
the research question due to the high interdependence among several types of firms in the industry. 
Carriers, handset makers, software platforms, brand owners, developers, and publishers all provide 
an essential part of the product, which makes interfirm ties important for the survival of these firms 
(Figure 1).  In addition, following a market from nascent to growth stage in real-time allows the 
examination of changes in interfirm ties as market uncertainty and competition levels change.  
---------INSERT FIGURES 1, 2 AND TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE----------- 
6 entrepreneurial publishers were chosen as focal firms. Entrepreneurial firms are a good 
choice because we can track their ties from founding and avoid left-censoring. In addition, they 
typically have limited resources, and high dependence on interfirm ties for performance (Baum et al, 
2000; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996). Among different types of entrepreneurial firms in the 
research setting, game publishers are a good choice because they depend on many different types of 
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market players for survival (see Figures 1 and 2 for details). The chosen publishers are 
representative of the 41 entrepreneurial publishers that were operational in the nascent market as 
most publishers were stand-alone firms whose founders came from related industries (e.g. video 
gaming, telecommunications). Second, these firms were all founded in the nascent market and were 
operational during growth market with multiple interfirm ties (Table 2). Finally, the sample is 
stratified by geography across the three most important areas for wireless gaming firms: San 
Francisco, Los Angeles, and Seattle, to avoid regional biases.  
---------INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE----------- 
Data Sources 
There were several data sources: (1) in-depth semi-structured interviews; (2) extensive 
archival data (e.g. business publications, corporate materials, database of published wireless games) 
and (3) e-mails, phone calls, observations and follow-up interviews. Triangulation of data from 
multiple sources strengthens confidence in the robustness of the findings (Jick, 1979). 
The primary data source is semi-structured interviews. 95 interviews were conducted between 
late 2002 and late 2005, covering the entire nascent market period and the first three years of the 
growth period. Interviews at focal firms lasted 60-150 minutes and covered the firm’s tie formation 
and general activities since founding. Follow-up interviews were conducted at 6-9 month intervals 
to track real-time changes. In addition, for each focal firm, interviews were conducted with two to 
three key informants in major partner firms, whom focal firm informants identified as important 
partner contacts. Finally, interviews were also conducted with 8 industry experts (e.g., journalists, 
investors, consultants) to triangulate the data. Table 2 details the various types of informants that 
were interviewed in each focal and partner firm as well as other important aspects of data collection. 
Data Analysis 
Data analysis began with incorporating interview transcriptions and archival data into case 
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histories (Yin, 1984) using triangulation logic to give more validity to themes that emerged from 
different data collection methods (Jick, 1979). Two independent researchers reviewed the data to 
form independent opinions of events in each case. As is typical of inductive cross-case analysis, I 
used charts and tables to compare several categories at once (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007, Miles 
and Huberman, 1994). Quantitative measures from the Wireless Gaming Database (e.g. number of 
games, carriers and handset models per publisher) strengthened the comparison at this stage. From 
the emerging constructs and patterns, tentative propositions were formed and refined through 
replication logic. As the theoretical framework crystallized, comparison with the extant literature to 
highlight similarities and differences strengthened the internal validity of findings and raised the 
generalizability of results. The theoretical framework that emerged is described below.    
FINDINGS 
 
In order to explore the research question, how changing levels of uncertainty and competition 
during market growth affect the formation and evolution of interfirm ties, this study traced 6 
entrepreneurial firms in the US wireless gaming market. The first section of the results describes 
the changes in market conditions as the market transitioned from nascent to growth stage while the 
second section focuses on the consequences for the interfirm ties of the focal firms.  
MARKET TRANSITION FROM NASCENT TO GROWTH STAGE  
 
The market emerged in late 1999-early 2000 with few firms creating the first games for 
wireless phones. As typical of nascent markets, uncertainty was high and competition was low at 
that time (Anderson and Zeithaml, 1984; Klepper, 1996; Steensma and Corley, 2000). There was a 
high degree of technological uncertainty due to primitive purchasing and gaming interfaces. First, it 
was difficult to purchase a game. An analyst described: “The purchase process was so torturous... 
Like you have to enter your credit card every time you buy a new game!” The actual gaming 
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experience was not smooth either. A publisher VP remembered: “Back then, you couldn’t do half 
the things you can do in a game today. It was just so unbelievably primitive…Like you couldn’t 
even do multi-player games. You were locked into your own phone.” As expected, these 
technological limitations and the low number of games led to market (demand) uncertainty. Users 
remained either unaware of wireless games or discouraged by the difficulty of purchasing and 
playing them. As sales numbers remained low and purchasing systems primitive, target consumers 
and preferred game genres were also ambiguous. As an industry analyst summarized, “At that point, 
there was some availability of mobile games, but it was very spotty and very very niched.” 
By mid 2002, technological uncertainty decreased as carriers (e.g. Verizon, Sprint, Cingular) 
launched more user-friendly interfaces for purchasing and gaming. One analyst described, “So it 
was really in the 3rd quarter of 2002 when all of a sudden consumers could go into a store, buy a 
phone, download content, and the price of that content would show up on their monthly bill.” This 
meant that carriers could track their game sales more easily and do targeted marketing. A further 
decrease to market uncertainty came once carriers began advertising campaigns. An industry expert 
said, “In Q4 2002, Verizon, Sprint and AT&T all took out TV ads, print ads, like on the first page of 
USA Today. Verizon had trailers that were running before movies. Even in New York City, they 
were wrapping little bus kiosks with their stuff.” In addition, wireless gaming got a “kickstart” with 
Verizon’s campaign subsidizing game-capable handsets. An expert noted:  
“When a consumer went into a Verizon store to upgrade their phone for the holiday season in Q4, 
they could buy a download-capable handset for $50. And that move really kick-started the installed 
base of the handsets out there so that people could very quickly get a phone that was capable of 
downloading entertainment and start using it. It was even possible for consumers to buy a 
download-capable handset for $50 and get a second one for free during the holiday season of 2002.”  
 
With the number of game capable phones increasing, playing wireless games quickly became 
popular. An entrepreneur described: “We started hearing stories that people would go home and 
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play on their phone for hours instead of the Xbox. It was meant to be for when you wait for the bus 
or at the dentist, you know? But people couldn’t put it down...” At the end of 2003, when the new 
phone number portability law allowed customers to switch carriers and maintain their number, 
carriers used this opportunity to further raise awareness of wireless games and attract new 
customers. This marked the end of the market emergence period, or “round 1” as market analysts 
called it, when market uncertainty decreased and new entrants increased significantly (Table 1).  
CONSEQUENCES OF MARKET TRANSITION FOR INTERFIRM TIES  
What did the lower uncertainty and higher competition mean for interfirm ties in the market? 
These ties were strengthened, weakened, or even terminated as a consequence of previous partners 
becoming competitors or competitors of current partners entering the market. These effects largely 
depended on firms’ tie strength and performance with current partners, as described below.  
Finding 1: Previous Partners Becoming Competitors 
In the highly uncertain environment during market emergence, focal publishers had formed 
licensing ties with well-known consumer brands (e.g. Suzuki Motors or Disney) to increase the 
legitimacy and visibility of their games. These ties were typically based on revenue share (up to 30% 
for brand owners), which worked well for the entrepreneurial publishers as they had limited 
resources. It also allowed brand partners to observe game sales based on their own brand directly.  
As the market entered growth stage and demand uncertainty decreased, brand partners noticed 
rapidly growing revenues from wireless, particularly if the branded game became a “hit”2. For 
instance, Starclick had a licensing tie with video game giant Electronic Arts (EA) in the nascent 
market, which allowed them to successfully transfer well-known EA games such as Tiger Woods 
Golf to handsets. As Starclick became a market leader and these games reached high sales figures, 
                                                 
2Informants defined a hit game as one with sales in the top 95th percentile. An industry analyst explained that a hit game 
had about 50,000 downloads while a non–hit game got about 5,000, and thus brought much more revenue. Informants 
agreed that this was partly because carriers were more likely to further promote the game once it was already popular.  
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EA became highly aware of the market potential in wireless gaming. Starclick CEO explained: 
“When we had visited them for the first time, they had looked at us in disbelief that this would ever 
take off. It was just not on their radar.” However, in 2004, when it was time for Starclick and EA to 
renew the annual licensing contracts, EA executives withdrew their licenses to continue “on their 
own”. Interviews revealed that a very important factor in EA’s decision was their observation of 
Starclick’s success with EA’s game titles. An EA executive explained: “Wireless games are 
growing faster than we expected…and companies like <Starclick> are the living proof that sports 
games work great on mobile phones.” Through Starclick, EA executives had the opportunity to see 
how many downloads their various games reached at which carriers, and to establish visibility in the 
market for their games, which helped them sell these games upon direct market entry.  
How did the partners’ direct market entry affect the focal firms? For Starclick, EA’s direct 
market entry had severe consequences. An industry analyst explained: “These were top selling 
games for Starclick. Not only are they losing the games, but EA will now sell the same games that 
users have gotten to know and love because of Starclick.”  The loss of EA games also had an effect 
on the strength of Starclick’s ties with carriers. The executives explained: “We are visiting our 
partners one by one and showing them all the games we have in the pipeline for them. We are 
showing them that we are greater than just those few games that did well in the past.”  
Data show that several prominent brand partners similarly entered the market directly during 
market growth3 (Table 1). For video game publishers (e.g. EA or Sega), this was a step of forward 
integration as this new market was highly related to their existing market. For other firms such as 
media and entertainment channels (e.g. Disney or Fox Sports), the market entry was to take 
                                                 
3 When a brand owner abandoned a publisher, they had to “rewrite the game” as the code was proprietary to the 
publisher. For video game brands, the issue was minor as there was already code sharing in order to make the characters 
look the same across different gaming platforms and the video game brand had the internal capability to do this. Others 
typically hired coders from the publisher or third party developers and made a new version of the game, which looked 
slightly different, but was improved in several ways.  
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opportunity in a promising new market. An executive at Fox Sports, for instance, revealed that a 
joint marketing campaign with publisher Cellcruise and carrier Sprint PCS “woke them up”: “That 
competition we organized went very well… It was a bit unexpected for us...But it certainly raised 
the profile of mobile gaming and accelerated things.”  
As apparent above, brand partners’ direct market entry was a “winner’s curse”: the more 
successful the tie, i.e. the better the publisher did in the market using their partner’s license, the 
quicker the partner became intrigued to enter directly. High performing publishers such as Starclick 
or Topmobile suffered from the loss of high-profile brand partners (e.g. EA, ESPN, or Atari). In 
contrast, lower performing publishers such as Mobilate, Airburst, and Phonemix did not lose 
partners this way4 (See Table 3 for supporting evidence). An industry analyst described: “It’s 
almost like these startups are paying a price for raising the profile of mobile gaming.”  
---------INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE----------- 
A primary factor that led to this winner’s curse was that the licensing agreements required the 
partners to work closely during game creation, but not afterwards, which contributed to brand 
owners not keeping wireless games on their radar unless the incoming revenues were noticeable. 
For instance, Topmobile VP Publishing and Sales said: “They don’t need to see us at all once they 
approve the game, so they sometimes even forget that they’d done this deal at all…” while a 
Cellcruise executive added: “There is no real interaction with the brand partners beyond the initial 
stage, unless we do sequels or a new game or something…” Overall, this first finding suggests that, 
Proposition 1a: As uncertainty decreases during market growth, prominent firms that have been 
linked to the market through interfirm (e.g. licensing) ties may decide to cut them and enter directly.  
                                                 
4 In line with tie failure due to partners’ below-desired benefits from the tie (Arino and de la Torre, 1998; Azouley et al, 
2010; Duysters et al, 1999; Heimeriks et al, 2015), firms like Mobilate and Airburst lost a brand partner due to their 
partners’ discontentment from game sales. Airburst, for instance, lost their licensing agreement for the Garfield brand 
when the partner decided to give the license to a larger competitor who knocked on their door. 
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Proposition 1b: For their partners, this effect is a “winner’s curse”: the more successful the tie, the 
more likely that the prominent firm will break it off, and the more detrimental the performance 
consequences of this loss for the abandoned partner.  
 
Finding 2: Existing Partners Dissolving Ties to Downsize Their Network 
Another form of competition that affected focal firms during market growth was tie 
competition against new market entrants, both entrepreneurial firms and large ones such as the 
brand owners discussed in the previous finding. For example, Phonemix was an entrepreneurial 
publisher that entered the market at the end of the nascent stage, and already had ties with two 
prominent carriers by the end of 2002 (Table 1). As these ties were still relatively new compared to 
those of some other publishers, the executives worked hard to strengthen them, scheduling frequent 
carrier visits to increase their games’ visibility on carriers’ networks. The CEO explained: “We 
knew we were the new guys, so we gave them all our attention, called and visited them whenever we 
could.” By early 2004, however, Phonemix executives were caught by surprise when both carriers 
announced that they were cutting many ties including Phonemix. Among Phonemix’s competitors 
in the sample, only Starclick and Topmobile maintained ties with those carriers.  
---------INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE----------- 
In total, four out of the five prominent carriers downsized their publisher network during 
market growth (Table 4). Interviews revealed that a number of factors drove this decision. First, as 
mentioned before, an influx of publishers occurred during the market growth stage. When all new 
publishers started knocking at carriers’ doors to sell games, the first response of the carriers was to 
accept all to increase the variety of games in their network. However, soon carrier executives 
realized that they had too many partners and prospective partners to deal with. They explained that 
as the market became more competitive, publishers became quite insistent towards carriers to get a 
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better placement for their games5. The Topmobile CEO explained: “Shelf space in mobile is vertical 
rather than lateral. I walk through a store, I can find potato chips, and cookies and salsa all at my 
eye level. A mobile phone has only six spots on that little screen and 2000 games are fighting for 
those spots.” A carrier executive described how this competition led to publishers “harassing” 
carriers to get a visible spot on the network: “My phone doesn’t stop ringing. Some of these guys 
even show up in my office unannounced to show me their new games.” Another executive said: 
“<Publishers> chase me to my car after work. I feel like a celebrity sometimes.”  
The second factor that fueled carriers’ decision was the lower uncertainty in the market, which 
allowed them to select a few publishers based on game sales record. A carrier executive explained:  
“We are going to work with a select number of publishers from now on. They all have a track 
record that we can judge by now and plus, we have gotten to know several of them very well. It’s 
more efficient this way.”  
As predicted by extant work (e.g. Koka et al, 2006), the combination of higher competition 
and lower uncertainty led to many publisher ties being discontinued in this growth stage market. But 
surprisingly, data revealed that carriers’ decision to downsize and the magnitude of the downsizing 
were not entirely voluntary; they were also due to their internal limitations at the time. These 
executives were part of large and resourceful corporations, but their gaming/ mobile content 
departments were still small and understaffed, typically with 3-5 people, as wireless gaming was 
only slowly gaining visibility within the larger corporation. The Topmobile President said: “The 
process of working with them and getting our games on the deck has been a nightmare. It can take 
like 3 months for them to even look at the stuff we send them…Part of it is that they are seriously 
understaffed.” Publishers explained that these limitations were partially due to carriers still thinking 
that their business was about selling handsets and voice calling plans. Mobilate CEO explained:  
                                                 
5 Publishers’ survival depended on the availability/visibility of their games at carriers’ network. The primitive nature of 
handsets and gaming databases in this pre-smartphone era prevented consumers from previewing all games available in 
a genre easily. This made purchasing decisions heavily dependent on carriers’ product placement and promotions.  
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“The biggest challenge with carriers is that they have not yet become effective partners for content. 
Even the executives we work with seem forced from their organization to support marketing 
programs for handsets and voice calling plans, occasionally using content as a hook. You know, buy 
this game-capable handset and get another one for free kind of stuff…”  
In addition, carriers were large and traditional corporations that were slow in updating their 
infrastructure and had interdepartmental coordination difficulties. Topmobile President complained:   
“Their ability to execute on new products is very low. They have difficulties with their general 
network infrastructure, data network infrastructure and interconnection, billing and product 
management systems. Getting things to work is often a very very long and drawn out process. For 
example, the consumer says I don’t want to pay for games every time, I want to subscribe to a 
monthly service. So the carrier goes to their billing department and the billing guys say “sure, it 
will be about 2.5 years until we can do that”.  
 
The CEO at Mobilate similarly said: “Like any typical large corporation, carriers are slow to adjust 
to changes in their environment. They still use ancient technology.” VP Marketing at Cellcruise 
complained about the disconnect between different departments at carriers:  
“The correspondence at the carrier is with a department that all carriers have designated to phone 
games. These departments have an entrepreneurial spirit to them and it is fun to work with them. 
The people are young and enthusiastic people who enjoy games. But often there is a huge 
disconnect between the “game department” and other departments like marketing or IT.”  
Overall, both changing market conditions and resource limitations affected carriers’ decision 
to downsize. They started cuts with publishers with low game sales, which, many publishers 
complained was not fair as sales volumes depended largely on promotions and visibility received 
from the carrier. A Phonemix executive said, “First they don’t give you a chance and then they say 
you didn’t do that well. The type of promotion that <competitor> gets from <carrier> is something 
that I can only dream of.” VP Marketing at Cellcruise added: “We want an equal opportunity, they 
don’t have to be exactly the same, but roughly equal”. A carrier executive explained:  
“It could be that we haven’t got a chance to get to know these guys yet or maybe they’ve been 
around but they didn’t have any games that stood out from the crowd…I don’t have time to be fair, I 
need to go with who I know can deliver best-selling games”.  
Following the cuts, publishers could only deliver games to carriers through chosen publishers. 
As expected, this tie brokerage (Burt, 1992) led to arbitrage opportunities. Airburst CEO added: 
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“When those guys present new games to <carrier>, they put all of their games first and ours is 
lucky if it makes the list at all.” Carriers admitted the drawbacks of this approach as follows:  
“Sure, there is lots of stuff we could do right now. Multiplayer games are becoming a thing. All 
sorts of interesting games, well, not even games, but content really. It is a very exciting time and I 
wish I had the bandwidth to pick and choose.”  
 “Do I trust that I will get the best games in the market in an unbiased way? No, of course not. But I 
will get pretty good games and I will get them much faster this way.”  
What were the consequences of carrier cuts for focal firms? The termination of these ties set 
firms like Airburst and Phonemix on a downward spiral. First, they had significantly lower revenues. 
Second, they lost or could not form new ties with brand partners because brands were interested in 
publishers with resourceful carrier partners who could promote their games6. Without prominent 
brand partners, they became even lower priority to carrier partners. Third, their limited resources 
prevented these firms from meeting existing carrier partners’ expectations such as joining large 
marketing campaigns or making games available on a variety of phones. This further weakened 
their existing ties and even prevented them from receiving venture backing. When Airburst 
executives sought venture support at the beginning of 2004, for instance, they could not convince 
investors to make a significant investment due to their lack of prominent partners. The VP indicated:  
“They were impressed with our games, but kept asking why we didn’t have partners like the other 
guys…Carriers wanted to see brand partners, brands wanted to see either carrier partners or 
money, and the investors wouldn’t give us money without these. The irony is that we wouldn’t need 
them if we had those partners; we’d have the money!” 
 
In contrast, firms with high-performing ties to prominent partners experienced partners’ 
downsizing positively through even higher performing ties. Starclick CEO explained: “Of course, 
it’s nice for us if those guys are less busy. They pay more attention to us and we get more work from 
them.” These firms also used their new status to form/strengthen ties (i.e. work on more games) 
with prominent brand partners. A Topmobile executive stated: “The fact that we are so close to 
                                                 
6 That focal publishers were no longer valuable once their prominent partners were gone confirms the tertius iungens 
logic (Obstfeld, 2005), which explains the value of connecting disconnected but potentially complementary parties.  
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<carrier> means that our games are more visible on their network. Brand partners like that, 
naturally.” Table 4 provides an overview and supporting material for this finding.  
Proposition 2a: As a market enters growth stage, prominent firms that operate in multiple markets 
may experience a lag in allocating resources to handle the exponential growth in business volume 
and number of partners. This lag, along with lower uncertainty about partners’ performance, can 
lead these firms to downsize their alliance network. 
Proposition 2b: In this process, partners with low to mediocre tie-performance typically lose their 
tie while the remaining partners enter a positive spiral of increasing tie strength and performance.  
 
Finding 3: New Types of Players Entering the Market  
The growth stage of the market also came with a “good kind of competition” for the focal 
entrepreneurial firms. New types of players such as Yahoo or start-up Handango officially entered 
the market, offering wireless game purchasing online. Google started discussions to do the same. 
These new entrants created competition for carriers. An industry analyst explained:  
“Yahoo is a new company that spooks the carriers cause they want the customers. Yahoo could 
easily use their IM client as a software distribution mechanism. People are on My Yahoo page all 
they long checking stock prices, reading the news and looking at sports scores. If they figure out a 
way to sell mobile content there... It’s a Trojan horse. And the carriers know that.”  
 
Focal publishers followed different strategies with regards to forming ties with these new 
entrants. For publishers who had already lost many prominent partners (e.g. Airburst and Phonemix7) 
during the growth market, this became a ‘consolation prize’ so they immediately initiated ties with 
Google, Handango and Yahoo. An Airburst executive explained:  
“Carriers can do things like say, “We’re going to block this; we don’t need another sports game.”  
Once they do stuff like that, you’re completely out, you can’t do anything. So you need a backup 
plan if you’re not getting your games through.”  
Airburst CEO added: “It was either this or closing shop.” Phonemix VP explained that one 
advantage of online game sales was that customers looked at a larger screen while choosing, which 
avoided publishers relying on carriers’ favors for product placement:  
                                                 
7 Mobilate executives were in discussions to sell their firm at that time so did not consider this alternative.  
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“These websites have a rather transparent display of available games under simple categories. So 
no more ‘feature games’ or ‘top picks’. Everybody has a fair chance.”  
 
Among the focal publishers, Starclick and Topmobile, publishers with high performing ties to 
many prominent partners, also decided to work with alternative channels to decrease their 
dependence on carriers. During the interviews, Topmobile and Starclick executives listed two main 
reasons for their choice. First, as indicated in the previous finding, the publishers were unhappy 
with the amount of attention and resources the carriers were allocating to the wireless game market:  
“Because the carrier guy, they have no clue, right.  They’re still trying to gage what users are doing.  
And they don’t have the expertise to do it, and they’re only going on gut.  Which is fine, gut is fine, 
when you have nothing else to go on; but when you have stats to go on, why don’t you use them 
instead.” <VP Marketing, Starclick> 
“We ultimately believe that the carriers are the best channel, we still believe that. They have the 
position to make mobile gaming successful. If they want to… And that´s the crucks. Because 
sometimes they move on to other stuff, you never know. Like crazy TV on your phone or videos, and 
suddenly mobile doesn´t get any more attention. I can´t allow my business to be blown like a reed in 
the wind of whatever the carrier thinks is the hot button issue of the day. I need control, I need some 
slight degree of control over my destiny.” <Topmobile CEO> 
 
In addition, the executives complained about the aggressive partnership terms at the carriers.  
 
“Carriers tend to be self-interested. They believe they are the best, they are the dominant people in 
the world, so they should get all of the revenue. The challenge in our industry is that the carriers 
take an undue, unfair share of the revenue for what’s being delivered. That ultimately and 
potentially can be extremely detrimental to the industry.” <Topmobile CEO> 
Commenting on carriers’ harsh terms, Phonemix executives revealed, “we gave them 70%, I know 
some guys got better deals, but no deal was good enough.” 
Both Starclick and Topmobile started publishing games with Yahoo and Handango. Starclick CEO 
explained how he tried to convince carriers to accept these new ties:  
“Well, it had to be sold to them. I literally went around this last January to every single important 
US carrier and explained to them why it wasn’t a threat. I told them we are trying to grow the 
market. We are trying to market to people who aren’t normally the buyers of games.”  
 
 22 
Finally, Cellcruise, a publisher that still maintained ties to four carriers, but received much less 
business compared to Starclick and Topmobile, decided not to approach the alternative sales 
channels at first. Given their “vulnerable” position, they found this option “too risky.”  
“Right, so we discussed that and decided not to do it. It would be a mistake to try to go around 
carriers.  You can’t piss them off.  They actually are the gatekeepers right now; if you’re not in bed 
with the carriers, there’s no way you’re going to get any distribution at all.  So you can’t give up 
carriers.  The only thing is, carriers have to have a constant revenue stream.  Any company who 
tries to go around carriers is making a mistake.” <Cellcruise CEO> 
 
A VP at Cellcruise further explained that if they did not bring their newest games to the carrier 
immediately, answer their calls promptly, or make the desired changes to the games, carriers could 
make them much less visible on their platform or abandon them entirely. He added: “Second tier 
publishers like us often feel that if we don’t do things exactly right, we will lose big time.”  
But Cellcruise executives eventually changed their mind. Once top publishers (e.g. Starclick 
and Topmobile) formed ties with alternative sales channels, Cellcruise executives also started 
negotiations. A Cellcruise executive explained: “This is just something we are doing on the side. 
Our focus is still the carrier. However, we feel it is a good idea to explore different options without 
going behind their back.” A Topmobile executive explained how their tie formation had a signaling 
effect: “We’re the big dog…Nobody will not be with us. So when we went with those guys, it was a 
signal to the market that this was ok, this was legit.” By the end of data collection, four of the focal 
publishers, including Cellcruise, were selling games through wireless game websites. These sites 
continued operations until the competitive landscape dramatically changed with the 2007 launch of 
the IPhone. Unable to compete with Apple’s application store, they were discontinued. Overall, this 
finding about tie formation with new entrants, summarized in Table 5, illustrates, 
Proposition 3a: In a growth stage market, the entry of new types of prominent firms may threaten 
the power of existing prominent firms.  
Proposition 3b: Entrepreneurial firms with high performing ties as well as those with low-
performing or no ties to prominent partners are likely to form ties with these new types of firms. In 
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contrast, those “stuck in the middle” with mediocre ties to few prominent partners find this move 
too risky and wait for a first mover to legitimate these ties. 
 
The findings described in this section are summarized in Table 6 while Table 7 shows the 
general evolution of focal firms’ ties and Table 8 the changes in focal firms’ performance8.  
---------INSERT TABLES  5, 6, 7, 8 ABOUT HERE----------- 
DISCUSSION 
This study explored how changing market conditions affect formation and evolution of 
interfirm ties by tracing 6 entrepreneurial publishers during the growth stage of the US wireless 
gaming market. The findings reveal that as uncertainty decreases, certain ties are terminated due to 
competition while others become stronger, suggesting that market conditions in growth stage 
markets can have different consequences depending on firms’ existing ties, relative power and 
partners’ strategies and limitations (Table 9). The section below describes how the findings inform 
our knowledge of interfirm ties, entrepreneurship, and the evolution of markets and networks.  
---------INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE----------- 
Interfirm Ties during Market Growth 
Earlier studies (e.g. Baum et al, 2000; Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009; Santos and Eisenhardt, 
2009) identified nascent markets as an advantageous environment for entrepreneurial firms to form 
ties with prominent partners. This study shows that in contrast, entrepreneurial firms may lose a lot 
of ties during market growth. Extant work suggests that ties are typically discontinued for two 
reasons. “Tie failure” occurs due to partners’ below-desired benefits from the tie, either due to 
partner’s perceived quality or interpartner coordination difficulties (Arino and de la Torre, 1998; 
Azouley et al, 2010; Duysters et al, 1999; Heimeriks et al, 2015). On the other hand, “expected tie 
                                                 
8 This study made no attempt to quantify the net effect of these events on firm performance as it largely depended on 
how many prominent partners were lost versus maintained after partners’ downsizing or direct market entry.  
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dissolution” (at least by one of the partners) occurs due to learning races (Hamel, 1991; Inkpen and 
Beamish, 1997; Khanna et al, 1998), i.e. when one partner dissolves the tie as soon as their private 
benefits (learning a new technology, conditions of a new market, etc.) are realized, or due to 
strategic options (Kogut, 1991; Chi, 2000; Folta and Miller, 2002), i.e. when the larger partner 
acquires the smaller partner whose niche product / technology / market proves worthy of investment 
(Reuer and Koza, 2000; Villalonga and McGahan, 2005). This study finds that entrepreneurial firms 
at opposite ends of the tie performance spectrum can experience tie dissolution during growth 
market. Some tie dissolution is due to low tie performance, where, as uncertainty goes down, firms 
reevaluate their partners and cut low-performing ones. Other ties, however, are dissolved because 
the tie becomes a strategic option for the partner to enter the market directly. Extant literature 
suggests that partners’ relational rents from a tie and therefore likelihood of investing into a tie 
increase with the volume of transactions and the degree of collaboration between the partners (Dyer 
and Singh, 1998; Madhok and Tallman, 1998), as well as the partners’ experience with ties and tie 
management capability overall (Anand and Khanna, 2000; Kale et al, 2002; Lavie and Singh, 2012). 
This study brings a nuance to these previous findings by showing that those ties that are managed 
best and reach highest levels of performance are a double-edged sword because they may entice 
partners that are evaluating a new market to enter the market more quickly.  
A surprising effect that this study uncovers regarding dissolution of high performing ties, 
however, is that some partners, particularly licensors, can be dormant, i.e. may forget about the 
market over time unless high tie performance wakes them up to dissolve the tie and go it alone. This 
shows that while initial in-licensing ties are known to be an effective way to test new markets 
before entry (Atuahene-Gima, 1992; Zahra and Nielsen, 2002), they can be flawed in that licensing 
ties do not require frequent interaction with licensees after product approval. In addition, prior 
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research shows that partners receive mostly context-specific information from their alliance 
(Mulotte, Dussauge and Mitchell, 2013; Yang, Lin and Peng, 2011). The combination of these two 
factors can lead to dormant ties and attribution errors (Kelley, 1971; Kelley and Michela, 1980) in 
market entry decisions in that partners of less successful firms may miss opportunities to enter a 
market due to discounting mediocre tie performance with unfavorable market conditions. The 
implications of this for entrepreneurial firm strategy are discussed in the following sections. 
Another unexpected dynamic that this study uncovers regarding tie dissolution is how internal 
issues at prominent partners may affect tie dissolution during growth stage markets. Prior work (e.g. 
Kale et al, 2002; Lavie and Singh, 2012) shows that as their number of alliances grows over time, 
firms typically build alliance management capabilities (e.g. a formal corporate alliance function) 
and learn to manage alliances better. This study brings a nuance to these previous findings by 
showing how the situation may be different for prominent firms that operate in multiple markets. 
The findings suggest that these firms may experience a lag in allocating resources to handle the 
exponential growth in business volume and number of partners in a new market. Therefore, if the 
firm’s alliances are growing in a new market that is not yet a priority within the large firm, the firm 
may opt for making the alliance network more manageable by pruning it dramatically. This 
satisficing behavior (Simon, 1956) can in turn lead to reduced access to innovative firms in the 
market and has significant effects on the performance of entrepreneurial partners. For 
entrepreneurial firms, this finding provides a nuance to extant work on the benefits of large and 
resourceful partners for the performance of entrepreneurial firms (Baum et al, 2000; Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven, 1996; Stuart, 2000; Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009) and for the development of new 
markets (Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009). It shows that in new but rapidly growing markets, 
prominent firms may take time to divert their attention and resources from other markets, which will 
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cause them to respond slowly to growing market demand and existing partners. At the market level, 
this implies that while market entrance of prominent firms may help new markets take off quickly 
(Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009), the dedicated departments at these firms may not be able to grow as 
fast as the market, thereby limiting their partners’ growth opportunities.  
While the effect of the lost ties described above is very prominent, growth stage markets are 
not all about tie dissolution for entrepreneurial firms; new ties are formed as well. First, those 
entrepreneurial firms that ‘win’ the partner shakeout also gain other types of partners who want to 
establish an indirect connection to prominent partners. In addition, firms can form ties with new 
firms joining the market during growth stage to provide alternative channels for doing business. 
These later ties may provide the ‘losing’ firms with much needed resources when other partners are 
abandoning them. Extant literature suggests that firms can form ties with substitute or competing 
partners to reduce dependence on certain partners in the network (Gimeno, 2004; Lavie, 2007). This 
paper shows that while the likelihood of entrepreneurial firms leveraging such an opportunity 
follows a U-shaped curve, depending on the power of existing partners to threaten the firm to stay 
loyal or lose business, the signals the firm receives from the market in terms of acceptable behavior 
also play a role. Contributing to extant work on norms and rules in interfirm networks (e.g. Dyer and 
Nobeoka, 2000; Kogut, 2000; Podolny and Stuart, 1995; Stuart et al, 1999) this study shows how 
powerful firms can change rules in a network (e.g. whom to form ties with), which enables others to 
“mimic” their behavior (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) to alleviate the limitations of a lower power 
position in forming new ties that become available during growth market. 
Overall, this study makes a contribution to alliance and network literatures by considering the 
combined effects of changes in market uncertainty and competition on interfirm ties. Leveraging 
rich qualitative data, the findings also help inject organizational reality into interfirm dynamics. 
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They suggest that firms of different size and network experience market growth differently and that 
these experiences are intertwined through the ties that they form, manage, and cut over time.  
Growing with the Market? Entrepreneurship in Growth Stage Markets 
The findings also contribute to entrepreneurship literature by exploring the antecedents of 
different growth trajectories for entrepreneurial firms with similar starting positions. Prior work had 
suggested that the highly uncertain but less competitive environment in nascent markets allows 
entrepreneurial firms to form high performing ties with prominent partners (Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 
2009; Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009). This study expands this work by showing that those firms that 
build strong ties to prominent partners during the nascent market can translate these into high 
performing ties to survive the ‘partner shakeout’ in the growth market. The findings reveal that as a 
market grows, entrepreneurial firms enter a race to tie performance with prominent partners. The 
finish line is when partners keep those ties above a performance threshold and cut everyone else9. 
This “rich get richer, poor get poorer10” effect of carriers’ downsizing confirms earlier findings (e.g. 
Powell et al, 2005) that firms with strong ties to prominent partners can use the resources flowing 
from these partners to invest into more business with them and new business with new partners. 
However, there is also a status-signaling element as firms like Starclick became high status in the 
network and got new partners and better deals with existing partners, as shown in Finding 3.  
As suggested above, this study finds that growth markets are mostly about structure. However, 
there is still room for agency for entrepreneurial firms operating in these environments. In the first 
finding, for instance, the loss of prominent brand partners resulted in reduced legitimacy and 
performance for all focal publishers, as predicted by extant work (Humand and Provan, 2000; Dacin, 
                                                 
9 Focal firms that entered market growth with strong ties to prominent partners were either acquired for record amounts 
(Starclick), or continued on their own successfully (Topmobile and Cellcruise) while others were either acquired for 
much smaller amounts (Mobilate), changed function (Airburst become a developer), or closed shop (Phonemix). 
10 The “Matthew effect” is a phenomenon whereby success replicates itself via a feedback loop (Merton, 1968). 
 28 
Oliver and Roy, 2006). However, the degree of these effects varied depending on firms’ strategy for 
tie formation and management. While Starclick focused on a few brand ties, Topmobile followed a 
generalist strategy, dividing resources over a higher number of partners. The advantage of 
Starclick’s strategy was higher quality games derived from more frequent interaction and more 
resources flowing from partners as well as a deeper understanding of the partner´s brand. But as 
explained before, this strategy also carried the risk that more successful games enticed partners to 
enter the market directly, and when they entered, the negative impact of the lost tie was larger. With 
Topmobile’s generalist strategy, the negative effect of lost ties was smaller. However, spending 
fewer resources on each prominent partner contributed to fewer ‘hit games’, which in a fad-driven 
market meant much lower revenues. This suggests that given their limited amount of resources, 
entrepreneurial firms face a trade-off in their interfirm ties. The specialist strategy (i.e. focusing on 
strong ties with a few prominent partners) has a higher likelihood of bringing high revenues, but has 
a significant effect on focal firm performance if these partners cut ties. The generalist strategy (i.e. 
hedging bets with weaker ties to a higher number of prominent partners) avoids significant negative 
effects following tie losses, however also has a lower likelihood of generating high revenues in a 
networked market where interfirm ties can significantly affect firm performance.  
The second finding on (carrier) partners downsizing their alliance network suggests that a 
specialist strategy is better for surviving the tie cuts given that only the highest performing ties 
survive the downsizing. Particularly for mediocre firms such as Cellcruise, focusing on fewer 
partners has a higher likelihood of leading to success, given the limited resources of the firm. 
Taken together, these two findings confirm that while in certain settings such as growth stage 
market networks, agency is constrained by network structure (Emirbayer and Goodwin, 1994), 
firms can still maneuver to improve their network position and subsequent benefits (Hallen, 2008; 
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Rindova et al, 2010; Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009). However, these findings also point to different 
directions for the optimal partner strategy. While the first finding suggests that there is a trade-off 
between specialist and a generalist strategy in tie resource allocation, the second finding suggests 
that a specialist strategy is better. This seeming discrepancy is explained by the fact that the partners 
in question in these findings are different types with different positions in the market and different 
goals for ties with focal firms. Future studies should analyze firms’ network strategy with attention 
to different partner types and the relative power of partners based on network position and size.  
Network and Market Evolution  
At a macro level, the findings also highlight how networks evolve and interfirm tie choices 
influence market dynamics. In their theoretical piece, Gulati et al (2000) called for future studies to 
uncover how networks evolve both exogenously, through environmental changes and jolts, and 
endogenously through the coevolution of interfirm ties. Later work investigated the dynamics of 
network structure (e.g. Bonaccorsi and Giuri, 2001; Orsenigo et al., 2001; Gay and Dousset, 2005) 
and the external (Balland, 2012; Broekel and Boschma, 2012) and internal forces (Gluckler, 2007; 
McKelvey, 2002; Volberda and Lewin, 2003) that drive network structures, but there is still little 
understanding of whether the effects of these mechanisms change as markets evolve (Ter Wal, 
2011). Looking at a real market network with interconnected firms of different types and sizes, this 
study contributes to extant work by highlighting various drivers of interfirm coevolution and 
network evolution following a change in environmental conditions. Confirming earlier work 
(Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Baron et al, 1999; Klepper, 1996), the first and third findings show that 
lower uncertainty leads to more firms, including new types, crowding the market. However, this 
overall growth can mask nuanced ways in which prominent firms downsize their network during 
market growth, which can push many partners to the periphery of the network while a few become 
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more central with stronger ties to prominent firms, driving the market towards a small world 
network (Watts and Strogatz, 1998). This suggests that market conditions driving change are more 
complex than just a joint increase in competition and reduction in uncertainty. Other factors such as 
the ability of large versus small firms to manage ties and keep up with market growth also matter as 
micro-mechanisms driving network evolution in growing markets. 
This also helps us explain the dynamics driving an industry shakeout. While studies have 
shown quantitatively that developing industries experience a shakeout in the number of producers at 
some point (Gort and Klepper, 1982; Klepper and Grady, 1990), very few scholars (e.g. De Vaan, 
2014) have explored the link between this phenomenon and interfirm ties. This qualitative study 
helps establish this link by revealing how in interdependent (i.e. networked) environments, where 
interfirm alliances are critical for firm performance, a partner shakeout may precede an industry 
shakeout. As prominent firms become more selective in their interfirm ties, many entrepreneurial 
firms are abandoned and face survival challenges. Overall, these findings build on extant work on 
market networks to uncover exogenous and endogenous drivers of network evolution.  
Managerial Implications 
The findings also have managerial implications. First, in contrast to prior literature (e.g. Gulati, 
1995; Uzzi, 1997) that emphasizes the benefits of arm’s length ties, this study finds that 
entrepreneurial firms need to enter the growth stage of a market equipped with strong ties to 
prominent partners to survive a possible partner shakeout. In terms of resource allocation, this 
means that entrepreneurs are better off picking a few prominent partners and doing well with them 
early on rather than distributing their time and resources equally among all partners. A second 
implication for entrepreneurs is to be aware of coopetition with prominent partners that may later 
enter the market directly. The higher the success of the tie, the more likely it can accelerate 
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prominent partners’ direct market entry. Anticipating this and creating a few alternative ties may 
prevent the firm from suffering big losses should the partner decide to enter the market directly. 
Overall, the findings highlight the importance of managing ties differently based on the type of tie 
and goal of the partner. Building on Bleeke and Ernst (1995) and Heimeriks et al (2015), they 
advocate remaining flexible during tie management as information asymmetries, intentions and 
bargaining power of partners can change and lead to abrupt tie dissolution. Earlier studies (e.g. 
Wassmer and Dussauge, 2011; Heimeriks and Duysters, 2007) suggest that alliance portfolio 
management is a critical process and goes beyond a firm’s capability of managing individual 
alliances. By anticipating how a firm’s ties can evolve depending on the factors described above, 
this study gives a tool for managers to evaluate their portfolios and take the necessary precautions.  
CONCLUSION 
This study explored how changing levels of uncertainty and competition during market growth 
affect interfirm ties of entrepreneurial firms. The findings provide a step towards understanding the 
relationship between firms, interfirm ties, and market evolution. A clear limitation of the study is its 
setting in a single market. Future studies should build on this research with larger samples to test 
some of the specific dynamics such as to what extent firms misattribute alliance success to market 
growth rather than partner capability; how firms’ tie formation with prominent partners’ competitors 
is affected by their extant ties, or to what extent growth markets experience expansion while 
becoming a small world network at the same time. Such a research agenda would place firm 
interaction and its multi-level consequences on center stage and continue the story.  
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Appendix 1: Measures of Interfirm Ties 
Interfirm ties were measured using characteristics commonly used in alliance and network research (e.g. Baum et al, 2000; 
Rowley et al, 2000) as well as characteristics that the informants regarded as particularly relevant (e.g., importance of strong 
ties with particular types of partners) as is common in grounded, inductive research (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989; Strauss and Corbin, 
1998). Consistent with prior research (e.g., Gulati, 1995; Rowley et al, 2000; Baum et al, 2005), the market network is defined 
in terms of the most influential firms in the market at the time of the study, namely the five major U.S. carriers that have over 
90% of the subscriber base, two handset makers that together sell over 80% of handsets in the U.S. at the time of the study, 
two technology platforms that are the only ones used in the industry, and an unconstrained number of brand owners because 
the number of brands is effectively without limit. This ensures a focus on ties of strategic importance as suggested by the 
definition of ties that was used (Gulati, 1995). The wireless gaming market network was smaller and more differentiated in 
terms of number of types of firms with distinct roles, dependences and importance within the network than those often 
examined in prior research (e.g., Gulati, 1995; Baum et al, 2000; Rowley et al, 2000).  
Type of Partners 
There are four primary types of partners that the focal firms (i.e., publishers) can potentially have within the wireless gaming 
market (see also in Figure 1). Carriers, who own the distribution channel to the wireless subscribers, brand owners whose 
brand can bring additional legitimacy and sometimes content to the game, platform providers who own an industry standard 
software platform that publishers and carriers use to interface with one another and for billing, and thus are necessary for 
selling game, and handset makers who provide the handsets that the publishers must ensure that their games are operable. 
Publishers also collaborated with game developers for the writing of game software code. These were mostly free-lance 
individuals and small firms that worked with publishers on a project basis. Informants did not consider game developers as 
important partners, and there are many such developers. Thus, these were omitted from the analysis.    
Prominence of Partners 
Prior research defines a prominent partner as a partner with high status (Podolny, 1993; Stuart et al, 1999) and abundant 
resources (Kogut, 1991; Powell et al, 1996; Baum et al, 2000; Stuart, 2000). Studies also suggest that prominent partners are 
particularly advantageous for the performance of ties (Stuart et al., 1999). I measured partner prominence in several ways that 
depended upon the type of partner.  For carriers, prominence was measured by the subscriber base of the carrier in the U.S. 
Data reveal that there were five prominent carriers in the U.S. at the time of study that accounted for over 90% of subscribers. 
Between the nascent and growth market stages, carriers slightly changed their market share in the market. However, these 
changes did not affect the overall ranking of the top five carriers. Brand owner prominence was measured through a survey in 
which 20 students from a major U.S. university (a prototypical target market for wireless gaming) ranked the brands of the 
focal firms from 1 to 10 where 10 indicated “I know this brand very well” and 1 indicated “I don’t know this brand at all”.  
The average of these ratings was taken for each brand, and then averaged over all brands of the firm. Brands with a rating 
greater than 7 were considered to be prominent.  There were two (technology) platform providers in wireless gaming during 
this study: Brew (by Qualcomm) and Java (by Sun). Both firms had significant market capitalization, employee count, and 
product innovation track records. The major US carriers chose one of these two platforms to provide games to their 
subscribers. Thus, both firms were considered prominent. The primary handset makers at the time of the study in the U.S. 
were Nokia and Motorola who together had approximately 80% market share of handsets. Both firms have significant market 
capitalization, employee counts, product innovation track records, and other signals of prominence. Thus, both firms were 
considered prominent.  It is important to note that the entry of smart phones (particularly the IPhone) changed the prominent 
players and the power dynamics in the wireless market. However, this study was conducted before smart phones entered the 
market.  
Importance of Partners 
All partner types were valuable to publishers. But as in many industries, some partner types were more important than others. I 
asked informants to rank partner types in their order of importance for the focal firm’s success. These rankings indicated that 
carriers were most important because they owned distribution, directly reached consumers, and could affect game sales 
directly (e.g. promotions, deck placement). Brand owners were ranked second because a prominent brand was influential in 
consumers’ purchasing decisions. For instance, a prominent carrier announced that 70% of its game revenues in 2004 were 
from branded games. Informants differed in their rankings of handset makers and platform providers, but collectively ranked 
them equivalently. Ties with platform partners helped firms adapt more quickly to advances in the software platform during 
market emergence. Handset manufacturers were helpful for adapting games to the latest phone models, but publishers also had 
access to these phones at the carriers. Informants agreed that both platform and handset partners were helpful early in the 
market because they could provide the publisher with introductions to other firms, opportunities to attend exclusive 
conferences and/or give keynote speeches. These ties lost their importance in the growth market once publishers had strong 
carrier and brand ties, which ultimately was critical for the inflow of revenues.  
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Sun  
(Java Platform 
Provider) 
# 1 Carrier 
Motorola 
(Handset Mnf) 
 
Brand Owner 
Brand Owner 
Brand Owner 
# 2 Carrier 
 
# 3 Carrier 
 
# 4 Carrier 
 
# 5 Carrier 
 
Nokia 
(Handset Mnf) 
 
Qualcomm  
(Brew Platform 
Provider) 
 
Non-exclusive contractual (revenue share) agreement 
Exclusive licensing 
(revenue share) 
agreement 
Non-
contractual 
technology 
collaboration 
Focal Publisher 
Figure 2: Nature of Ties Formed by Focal Publishers 
 
GAME DEVELOPER 
Free-lancers or small firms developing 
games for publishers, typically for $10-
100K per game. 
BRAND HOLDER (e.g. Suzuki Motors) 
Licenses brand to publisher for branded games 
(e.g. Suzuki Motor Race). Takes upfront payment 
or revenue share (up to 30%) for the license. 
HANDSET MAKER (e.g. 
Nokia) Works with publishers 
to increase phone’s value to 
carriers by increasing game 
capability, but does not get 
direct revenue from game sales. 
CARRIER (e.g. Verizon) 
Sells games to wireless subscribers (games are downloaded to 
the phone and billed monthly). Can affect game sales through 
product placement and promotions. Keeps 50-70% of revenue.  
PUBLISHER  
(typically entrepreneurial in 
nascent market) 
Takes game code from 
developers, attaches brand, 
adjusts to carriers’ platform 
and different handsets. 
Finally, sells game to 
carrier as finished product, 
keeps 30-50% of revenue. 
TECHNOLOGY PROVIDER 
(Qualcomm and Sun) 
Developer and provider of the 
game platform for wireless 
phones. 
Figure 1: Market Players in Wireless Gaming 
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11 In 2005, a decline is visible in the number of publishers in the market. This can be explained by the increased failure rate and acquisitions of smaller publishers as a 
result of higher competition, confirming the findings of Carroll and Hannan (1989), Hannan and Freeman (1987; 1988).  
 
 TABLE 1: MARKET TRANSITION FROM NASCENT TO GROWTH STAGE: NUMBERS AND QUOTES  
Market Stage Nascent (1999-2002) Growth (2003 onward) 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Market 
Growth by 
Numbers 
# Wireless 
Game Players 
1.3 mil 2.9 mil 5.5 mil 9.5 mil 
Total $ Spent 
by Customers 
$21 mil $91 mil $345 mil $605 mil  
# Games in the 
Market 
252 1557 2548 2673 
Evidence of 
Increasing 
Competition 
# Publishers in 
the Market 
41 136 217 16911 
Prominent 
Firms Entering 
the Market 
Carriers: Sprint, Verizon, AT&T  
Carriers: Cingular, T-
Mobile; Video Game 
Publishers: Sega, THQ; 
Media & 
Entertainment:  Disney, 
ESPN. 
Video Game 
Publishers: Electronic 
Arts; Media & 
Entertainment: HBO, 
Yahoo, Fox Sports. 
Video Game 
Publishers: Atari, 
Activision; Media & 
Entertainment: CBS 
Television. 
Evidence of 
Decreasing 
Uncertainty 
Technological 
Uncertainty 
Technical difficulties regarding the purchasing and gaming 
experience, no multiplayer games 
Streamlined purchasing and gaming experience, availability of multiplayer 
games 
Supporting 
Quotes for 
Technological 
Uncertainty 
“The purchase process was so torturous... Like you have to 
enter your credit card every time you buy a new game!”  
“There were game download difficulties, crashes while 
you played, small screens, it wasn’t pretty back then.” 
“So it was really in the 3rd quarter of 2002 when all of a sudden consumers 
could go into a store, buy a phone, download content, and the price of that 
content would show up on their monthly bill.”  
 
Market 
Uncertainty 
Low sales volumes, uncertainty about target consumers 
and popular game genres 
Exponentially growing sales, availability of sales numbers leading to 
increasing clarity about target consumers and popular game genres,  
Supporting 
Quotes for 
Market 
Uncertainty 
“We’re shooting darts in the dark.” 
“<Carriers> don’t know anything either… We’re figuring 
this out together… It’s all about who can make a 
convincing argument about which types of games would 
sell.” 
“Ok, the business is big enough now. There will be the entrance of new 
competitors for the people who survived Round 1.” “It’s much clearer now 
who plays games and what types of games they like. You wouldn’t expect 
it, but it turns out women play a lot, and they like casual games.” 
“<Publishers> all have a track record that we can judge by now.” 
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12 The focal firm interview guide started with the background and strategy of the firm and continued with major events in the formation / evolution of each tie, using an open-ended 
format and prompting with questions (e.g. how the opportunity presented itself, who was involved). Failed tie attempts and discontinued ties were noted in this process. The next 
section asked the informant to step through the key events of the tie, describing how and by whom these were handled. At later waves of data collection, the questions focused on 
changes in the firm’s ties since the last interview. The partner interview guide had the same basic structure. All interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed, most within 24 hours. 
Potential informant bias was addressed first, by using both real-time and retrospective data (Leonard-Barton, 1990). Collecting the data in several waves over 30 months also 
increased accuracy. Third, several interview techniques (e.g., “courtroom” questioning, event tracking, non-directive questioning) were used to yield accurate information from 
informants ((Eisenhardt, 1989; Huber and Power, 1985). Fourth, informants were chosen from multiple levels of hierarchy (e.g., CEO and VP levels) and in different functional 
areas (e.g., marketing, business development, engineering) to obtain a more accurate picture of events. In addition, highly knowledgeable industry experts were used as an 
independent data source. Fifth, anonymity was assured to informants to encourage candor. Finally, interviews were complemented with observations from five industry conferences 
and extensive archival data (e.g. business publications, Internet sources, and corporate materials).  
 
TABLE 2:  OVERVIEW OF FOCAL FIRMS AND INTERVIEW DATA 
Firm Location Founded 
Initial 
Investors 
Founding Team Characteristics Details of Data Collection12 
# 
Founders 
Prior 
Industry 
Prior 
Connections  
# Interviews 
Focal Firm Informants 
Interviewed  
Types of 
Partners Interviewed 
Starclick  
Los 
Angeles 
1999 
Corporate 
VC 
3 
Video 
Games Brand Owner 21 
CEO / Founder, VP Marketing, 
VP Sales, Chief Creative Officer 
Carrier, Brand, 
Handset, Platform 
Software 
Topmobile  Seattle 
 
 
1999 
 
VC 2 
Telecom 
Carrier 20 
CEO / Founder, President / 
Founder, VP Publishing and Sales 
Carrier, Handset, 
Platform Video 
Games 
Cellcruise  
San  
Francisco 
2000 VC 3 
Video 
Games 
Brand Owner 20 
CEO, VP Biz. Dev., 
VP Publishing, VP Licensing, VP 
Production 
Carrier, Brand, 
Platform 
Mobilate 
Los  
Angeles 
2002 Self 3 Telecom 
Platform 
Provider 
18 
Founder, CEO, President, 
VP Licensing, Director of 
Development Studio 
Carrier, Brand, 
Platform 
Phonemix Seattle 2002 
Corporate 
VC 
1 Telecom 
Carrier, 
Handset 
15 
CEO / Founder, VP Marketing, 
VP Development 
Carrier, Handset, 
Platform 
Airburst 
San 
Francisco 
2001 Self 2 
Video 
Games 
- 13 
CEO / Founder, VP Business 
Development / Founder 
Carrier, Handset, 
Platform 
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 (Phonemix, Mobilate and Airburst did not lose any brand ties due to partners’ direct entry)  
  
TABLE 3: LOST BRAND TIES AT FOCAL FIRMS DURING MARKET GROWTH (FINDING 1) 
Firm 
Lost 
Brand 
Ties  
Supporting Quotes 
Starclick 2 
“When we had visited them for the first time, they had looked at us in disbelief that this would ever take off. It was just not on their 
radar. But in time, this has changed. The more successful we became, the more they realized that they should be in there themselves” 
“We are visiting our partners one by one and showing them all the games we have in the pipeline for them. We are showing them that 
we are greater than just those few games that did well in the past.” Starclick CEO  
“Wireless games are growing faster than we expected…and companies like <Starclick> are the living proof that sports games work 
great on mobile phones.” EA Executive  
“These were top selling games for Starclick. Not only are they losing the games, but EA will now sell the same games that users have 
gotten to know and love because of Starclick…Oh sure, it was a surprise, not that it happened, but when it happened...  The sense is 
that <EA> were lucky to work with a great publisher that opened their eyes to this great new opportunity” Industry Analyst 
Topmobile 3 
“We always knew that Atari would come in for example. But with the other guys, it wasn’t clear to me at all. They just didn’t seem 
interested. But then suddenly they were…They don’t need to see us at all once they approve the game, so they sometimes even forget 
that they’d done this deal at all…” Topmobile VP  
“It’s almost like these startups are paying a price for raising the profile of mobile gaming.” Industry Analyst  
Cellcruise 1 
 “After this loss, I would say we are in a less good position. But luckily, this happened to the other big guys too” Cellcruise CEO  
“That competition we organized went very well… It was a bit unexpected for us...But it certainly raised the profile of mobile gaming 
and accelerated things.” Fox Sports Executive 
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TABLE 4: CHANGES IN CARRIERS’ PUBLISHER TIES DURING GROWTH STAGE MARKET (FINDING 2) 
Carrier Tie Management Strategy 
# Cut 
Ties  
Focal Publishers 
Affected 
Supporting Quotes 
1 
No official cuts, but stopped 
face-to-face meetings except with 
a few publishers and managed 
many partners thru website 
- 
Among focal firms, only 
Starclick maintained 
face-to-face meetings.  
“<Publishers> chase me to my car after work. I feel like a celebrity sometimes.” Carrier Exec  
“You can deliver to their website, but there is no way to see whether they are looking at your games”  
Phonemix CEO  
2 
In 2005, carrier cut down number 
of partners to make it more 
manageable 
Q1 2005: 
Cut from 
32 to 18 
publishers  
Among focal firms, only 
Cellcruise, Starclick, and 
Topmobile were chosen 
as key publisher partners.  
“My phone doesn’t stop ringing. Some of these guys even show up in my office unannounced to show 
me their new games…It could be that we haven’t got a chance to get to know these guys yet or maybe 
they’ve been around but they didn’t have any games that stood out from the crowd…I don’t have time to 
be fair, I need to go with who I know can deliver best-selling games… Sure, there is lots of stuff we 
could do right now. Multiplayer games are becoming a thing. All sorts of interesting games, well, not 
even games, but content really. It is a very exciting time and I wish I had the bandwidth to pick and 
choose.” Carrier Exec 
“We will continue to work with them. This is key for us” Cellcruise CEO  
"We were too late to be a key publisher for them.” Phonemix VP 
3 
Had an exclusive tie with 
Topmobile until 2004. In 2004, 
opened doors to new publishers, 
but decided to focus on top 
performers 
- 
Among focal firms, only 
Cellcruise, Starclick, 
Topmobile delivered to 
carrier. Others were told 
carrier was still 
terminating their 
exclusive contract.  
“We are unofficially working with them. They are not announcing it publicly yet” Starclick CEO 
“We were told they are going to meet with us soon. They are just in the middle of a legal mess right 
now” Mobilate VP 
“The process of working with them and getting our games on the deck has been a nightmare. It can take 
like 3 months for them to even look at the stuff we send them…Part of it is that they are seriously 
understaffed.”Topmobile President 
4 
In mid 2004, carrier cut down 
number of partners to make it 
more manageable 
Q4 2004: 
Cut from 
50 to 12 
publishers  
Among focal firms, only 
Starclick and Topmobile 
were chosen as key 
partners.  
“We have decided to only work with a few publishers to streamline our process...We had a great 
relationship with <Airburst> guys, but they just don’t have the connections in the market that we look 
for… Do I trust that I will get the best games in the market in an unbiased way? No, of course not. But I 
will get pretty good games and I will get them much faster this way.” Carrier exec. 
 “First they don’t give you a chance and then they say you didn’t do that well. The type of promotion 
that <competitor> gets from <carrier> is something that I can only dream of.” Airburst CEO 
“The correspondence at <carrier> is with a department that all carriers have designated to phone 
games. These departments have an entrepreneurial spirit to them and it is fun to work with them. The 
people are young and enthusiastic people who enjoy games. But often there is a huge disconnect 
between the “game department” and other departments like marketing or IT.” Cellcruise VP 
5 
Maintained partners for a while, 
but took time to organize gaming 
service 
Q1 2005: 
Cut from 
58 to 27  
Focal firms all formed 
ties with carrier, but sales 
volume never became 
satisfactory. 
“We are going to work with a select number of publishers from now on. They all have a track record 
that we can judge by now and plus, we have gotten to know several of them very well. It’s more efficient 
this way.” Carrier exec. 
 “We are one of their top partners. But things are very slow over there” Airburst VP/Founder 
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TABLE 5: TIE FORMATION WITH NEW PLAYERS (FINDING 3)  
Firm 
Ties Formed with 
Alternative Distribution 
Channels 
Supporting Quotes 
Starclick 
Negotiated with Google, 
Yahoo, Radio Shack. Published 
games, but terminated after 
being acquired.  
Rationale for Tie Formation: “Because the carrier guy, they have no clue, right.  They’re still trying to gage what users are doing.  And they 
don’t have the expertise to do it, and they’re only going on gut.  Which is fine, gut is fine, when you have nothing else to go on; but when you have 
stats to go on, why don’t you use them instead.” 
Outcome: “Well, it had to be sold to them. I literally went around this last January to every single important US carrier and explained to them 
why it wasn’t a threat. I told them we are trying to grow the market. We are trying to market to people who aren’t normally the buyers of games. 
So by doing that, it’s good for them.”  
Topmobile 
Published games on 
Handango and Yahoo Games. 
Websites closed after 2 years 
due to low traffic.  
Rationale for Tie Formation: “We ultimately believe that the carriers are the best channel, we still believe that. They have the position to make 
mobile gaming successful. If they want to… And that´s the crucks. Because sometimes they move on to other stuff, you never know. Like crazy TV 
on your phone or videos, and suddenly mobile doesn´t get any more attention. I can´t allow my business to be blown like a reed in the wind of 
whatever the carrier thinks is the hot button issue of the day. I need control, I need some slight degree of control over my destiny.” “Carriers tend 
to be self-interested. They believe they are the best, they are the dominant people in the world, so they should get all of the revenue. The challenge 
in our industry is that the carriers take an undue, unfair share of the revenue for what’s being delivered. That ultimately and potentially can be 
extremely detrimental to the industry.” 
Outcome: “We’re the big dog…Nobody will not be with us. So when we went with those guys, it was a signal to the market that this was ok, this 
was legit.” 
Cellcruise 
Initially avoided it. 
Approached these alternative 
channels only after Starclick 
and Topmobile formed the 
first ties.  
Rationale for (No) Tie Formation: “Right, so we discussed that and decided not to do it. It would be a mistake to try to go around carriers.  You 
can’t piss them off.  They actually are the gatekeepers right now; if you’re not in bed with the carriers, there’s no way you’re going to get any 
distribution at all.  So you can’t give up carriers.  The only thing is, carriers have to have a constant revenue stream.  Any company who tries to 
go around carriers is making a mistake.” “When you talk to <carriers> it’s very clear that you will not be given a favorable position in their 
network if your focus is elsewhere.”“Second tier publishers like us often feel that if we don’t do things exactly right, we will lose big time.”  
After competitors formed ties: “We went back and forth for a long time.” “Everyone is doing it right now” “This is just something we are doing 
on the side. Our focus is still the carrier. However, we feel it is a good idea to explore different options without going behind their back.” 
Outcome: “<Carriers> are being surprisingly open minded about it.” 
Phonemix 
Published games on 
Handango and Yahoo Games. 
Websites closed after 2 years 
due to low traffic. 
Rationale for Tie Formation: “We gave <carriers> 70%, I know some guys got better deals, but no deal was good enough” “These websites have 
a rather transparent display of available games under simple categories. So no more ‘feature games’ or ‘top picks’. Everybody has a fair 
chance.”  
Outcome: “I mean, we don’t know if this will pick up right, we are just getting started.” 
Mobilate 
Did not pursue strategy, execs 
were busy negotiating with a 
buyer.  
Rationale for (No) Tie Formation: “It was not on our radar at that time. Plus, it’s a gutsy thing to do.” 
Airburst 
Published games on 
Handango and Yahoo Games. 
Websites closed after 2 years 
due to low traffic. 
Rationale for Tie Formation: “Carriers can do things like say, “We’re going to block this; we don’t need another sports game.”  Once they do 
stuff like that, you’re completely out, you can’t do anything. So you need a backup plan if you’re not getting your games through.”” It was either 
this or closing shop.” 
Outcome: “If you’re still trying to please the carriers then it’s not as straight-forward as it was for us.” 
 43 
 
TABLE 6: OVERVIEW OF CHANGES IN ON FOCAL FIRMS’ INTERFIRM TIES DURING MARKET GROWTH 
Firm 
Lost Brand Ties 
due to Brands’ 
Direct Entry (P1) 
Effects of Carriers’ Decision to Downsize Publisher 
Network (P2) 
Tie Formation with New Players Providing Alternative Distribution Channels 
(P3) 
Lost Ties Stronger Ties  
Starclick 2 -  w/ # 1, 2, 3, and 4 Carriers 
Negotiated with Google, Yahoo and Radio Shack. Published games, however 
terminated these ties after being acquired.  
Topmobile 3 -  w/ # 2, 3, and 4 Carriers Published games on Handango and Yahoo Games websites.  
Cellcruise 1 w/ # 4 Carrier w/ # 2 and 3 Carriers 
Initially found strategy “too risky” and avoided it.  Approach these alternative 
channels only after Starclick and Topmobile formed the first ties.  
Phonemix - w/ # 2 and 4 Carriers - Published games on Handango and Yahoo Games websites.   
Mobilate - w/ # 2 and 4 Carriers - Did not pursue strategy, as executives were busy negotiating with a buyer.  
Airburst - w/ # 2 and 4 Carriers - Published games on Handango and Yahoo Games websites.  
TABLE 7: COMPARISON OF FOCAL FIRMS’ INTERFIRM TIES IN NASCENT VERSUS GROWTH MARKET  
Firm 
Types of Partners (in order of importance)  
Carrier ties Brand ties Handset ties Platform ties 
# Carrier 
Ties 
Total # Games 
Promoted by at 
least One 
Carrier 
Effect of 
Carriers’ 
Downsizing 
# Brand Ties 
Average 
Brand 
Prominence 
# Handset 
ties 
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Starclick 5 5 15 20 - 4 3 11 
2 (due to direct 
market entry) 
8.2 7.9 2 2 2 2 
Topmobile 5 5 15 18 - 3 4 19 
3 (due to direct 
market entry) 
6.9 6.3 1 2 2 2 
Cellcruise 4 3 1 2 1 2 4 9 
1 (due to direct 
market entry) 
5.7 6.1 0 2 2 2 
Phonemix 2 - - - 2 - - 4 - - 2.9 2 2 2 2 
Mobilate 3 1 - - 2 - 4 5 
1 (due to poor 
performance) 
6.0 5.5 1 2 2 2 
Airburst 2 - - - 2 - 2 2 
1 (due to poor 
performance) 
4.4 3.2 2 2 2 2 
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TABLE 8: CHANGES IN FOCAL FIRM PERFORMANCE 
FIRM 
# GAMES 
TOTAL # HIT 
GAMES 
INDUSTRY 
RANKING 
OTHER CHANGES IN PERFORMANCE  QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT (TYPICAL QUOTES) 
2003 2005 2003 2005 2003 2005 
SC 55 118 8 13 1 Top 5 
Successful IPO in 2004. Opened London 
office early 2005. Was acquired for 
$700M in 2005, which was considered a 
great success story in the industry.  
“The pond is bigger, right? But we are still a relatively 
large fish” CEO 
“I must say they held their own against the big guys that 
recently entered the market” Industry Analyst 
TM 102 189 7 10 2 Top 5 
Opened London office in 2004. 
Remained private and a top 5 publisher 
until end of data collection.  
“You can’t really look at it and say “we’re doing worse” 
cause it’s a lot harder now in this market” VP Sales  
“They continue to do well” Carrier Executive 
 
CC 27 41 2 3 8 
Not 
Top 
10 
Experienced drop in performance due to 
competition in growth market. New CEO 
sought another round of VC financing in 
2004 to fund turnaround.  
“The game has changed in a major way. We are trying 
our best to stay above the surface. Many of our 
competitors from earlier are sinking right now” CEO 
PM 
 
5 
 
20 
0 0 
Not 
top 
10 
Not 
top 
10 
Exited publishing business in 2004.  
“They were too late to get brands. They played it wrong 
and lost” Competitor 
“Haven’t heard of them in a while” Carrier Executive 
ML 9 15 1 1 
Not 
top 
10 
Not 
top 
10 
Acquired for about $30M at end of 2004 
by major European publisher.  
“It’s a global market now, so you’re competing against 
the European guys too” CEO 
“I personally think small guys are better off selling as 
quickly as possible before more of the big guys enter the 
market. So <CEO> did the right thing.” Carrier executive 
AB 8 17 0 0 
Not 
top 
10 
Not 
top 
10 
Exited publishing business in 2004 to 
become a game developer, delivering 
games to former competitors. 
“We know how publishers work, so I think we can do very 
well as a developer“ CEO 
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TABLE 9: COMPARISON OF NASCENT AND GROWTH STAGE MARKETS IN MARKET CONDITIONS AND CONSEQUENCES FOR INTERFIRM TIES  
Nascent 
Market 
Market 
Condition 
High Uncertainty Low Competition 
Effect of 
Market 
Conditions on 
Interfirm Ties 
Prior literature: Higher likelihood of adding new prominent 
partners and exclusive ties as prominent firms cannot assess 
prospective partners. 
Prior literature: Higher likelihood of adding new prominent 
partners and exclusive ties as prominent firms have few 
alternatives for partnership. 
Growth 
Market 
Market 
Condition 
Decreasing Uncertainty Increasing Competition 
Effect of 
Market 
Conditions on 
Interfirm Ties 
Proposition 1a:  As uncertainty decreases during market 
growth, prominent firms that have been linked to the market 
through interfirm (e.g. licensing) ties may decide to cut 
them and enter directly.  
Proposition 1b: For their partners, this effect is a “winner’s 
curse”: the more successful the tie, the more likely that the 
prominent firm will break it off, and the more detrimental 
the performance consequences of this loss for the 
abandoned partner.  
 
 
Pro  
 
 
Proposition 2a: As a market enters growth stage, prominent firms that operate in multiple markets may experience a lag in 
allocating resources to handle the exponential growth in business volume and number of partners. This lag, along with lower 
uncertainty about partners’ performance, can lead these firms to downsize their alliance network. 
Proposition 2b: In this process, partners with low to mediocre tie-performance typically lose their tie while the remaining 
partners enter a positive spiral of increasing tie strength and performance.  
Proposition 3a:  In a growth stage market, the entry of new types of prominent firms threaten the power of existing 
prominent firms.  
Proposition 3b: Entrepreneurial firms with high performing ties as well as those with low-performing or no ties to prominent 
partners are likely to form ties with these new types of firms. In contrast, those “stuck in the middle” with mediocre ties to 
few prominent partners find this move too risky and wait for a first mover to legitimate these ties.  
